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Corn Futures: Consumer Politics, Health, and Climate Change
by Jedediah Purdy and James Salzman
The price of grain is now directly tied to the price of oil.
We used to have a grain economy and a fuel economy.
But now they’re beginning to fuse.1

M

exicans have long been known as the Corn People,
but that label perhaps provides a better fit for modern day Americans. The simple seeds of corn play a fundamental role unprecedented in the history of human agriculture. Corn now underpins two major sectors—arguably the
two most important sectors—of our modern economy: food
supply and energy supply. How we choose to consume this
seed has far-ranging consequences for pressing issues as far
apart as climate change and diabetes, energy policy and immigration, tropical deforestation and food riots.2
Recent years have brought surging interest in both the
food we eat and the energy we use. The growth of farmers’
markets around the country, the decision of major retailers
such as Walmart to sell organic produce, and the popularity
of grocery chains such as Whole Foods all bear witness to
the fact that Americans care more and more about where
their food comes from and how it was grown. The recent
popularity of compact fluorescent light bulbs, hybrid cars
such as the Toyota Prius, and voluntary carbon offsets similarly demonstrates that individuals see a connection between their behavior and climate change, and care enough to
do something about it.3
As these examples make clear, individuals’ concerns
about food and climate are increasingly reflected in the marketplace. For a large number of people, consumption
choices can become explicitly political choices, expressing
both our personal values and the type of society we wish to
create. As the journalist Michael Pollan has claimed:
We get three votes a day, actually more, when we eat. If
we cast some of those votes with full consciousness of
what’s involved, and try to make better choices—which
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1. Steven Mufson, Siphoning Off Corn to Fuel Our Cars, Wash.
Post, Apr. 30, 2008, at A1 (quoting Lester Brown, President, Earth
Policy Institute).
2. The first part of this Article is largely based on the writings of Michael Pollan, who has popularized the modern significance of corn.
3. See generally Michael Vandenbergh, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1673 (2007).

might entail spending more money or going out of our
way—then that will help create the food chain we want.4

Perhaps surprisingly, corn sits at the juncture of the food
and fuel sectors, as the feedstock for much of our processed
food and the fuel stock for ethanol. If we are what we eat,
then we’re corn on legs.5 If we are what we drive, we’re increasingly corn on wheels.6
The rise of corn has brought great benefits, but its large
and growing costs have also become increasingly clear. In
this Article, we explore the unprecedented roles of corn in
our economy, explain how law and policy have shaped these
roles, uncover the environmental and social impacts of corn,
and consider how to think of consumption in this context. If
voting-by-buying is an increasingly relevant model of consumer engagement, can we envision consumers being presented with choices that address the social and environmental harms from our dependence on corn? More generally,
how should we think about consumer engagement, both its
limits and its potential, in the context of corn’s remarkable
impact on our world today? It is no exaggeration to say that
our future is inextricably linked with our future consumption choices of corn.
I. The Rise of Corn
We all studied in grade school the gift of corn from the Indians to the pilgrims. Corn became a staple crop of the
early settlers and pioneers moving to the West. Since the
end of World War II, thanks to petroleum-based fertilizers,
pesticides, herbicides, and ever-more sophisticated hybridization, corn farmers have enjoyed increasing yields.
This is equally true, however, for all commodity grains
over the last 50 years. The difference for corn lies in the
halls of Congress.

4. Bonnie Azab Powell, Journalism Professor Michael Pollan’s New
Book on the U.S. Food Chain Provides Few Soundbites—But Much
to Chew On, U.C. Berkeley News, Apr. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2006/04/11_pollan.
shtml [hereinafter Powell].
5. Id.
6. Literature on the impact of corn is filled with bad puns, including
“The Stalking of America” and “Kernel Knowledge.” See, e.g., Alex
Chadwick & Mike Pesca, Overabundance of Corn and Its Effect on
the Economy, http://www.michaelpollan.com/press.php?id=16 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter NPR Interview]; Powell, supra
note 4.
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Simplifying the history, prior to the Depression era, agricultural subsidies were insignificant.7 Faced with mounting
farm foreclosures and collapsing prices, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace,
oversaw the creation of a loan system. In lean years when
prices were low, farmers could take out government loans
and stockpile corn until prices rose again, at which time the
loan would be paid off. If the market did not rise, farmers
could give their corn to the government as payment for the
loan. The net result was a system that effectively smoothed
out cyclical swings in supply and demand. In 1972, however, a series of unrelated events (grain sales to Russia coupled with a poor growing season) led to rapidly rising food
prices. Eager to quell consumer unrest, Earl Butz, Secretary
of Agriculture in the Richard M. Nixon Administration, dramatically shifted policy. Instead of loans to be paid back
when prices rose, farmers were provided price support payments. They essentially were paid to produce corn they
could then sell on the open market. The current price support
is 28 cents per bushel.8 As Pollan puts it: “We’ve been supporting agriculture since the Depression, but we’ve changed
the way you do it—from essentially supporting the farmers
to supporting the crop.”9
As a result, farmers were paid for the production of corn,
disconnected from market demand. The intended results
were high production and low food prices, which are exactly
what we have gotten until very recently. The consequences
of this policy shift went far beyond corn on the cob. With
massive quantities of cheap corn available on the market,
corn came to be viewed as an inexpensive, reliable feedstock for a dizzying number of uses. Cattle raising, for example, largely shifted from grazing to concentrated animal
feeding operations (CAFOs) because it became cheaper to
buy corn than to use other feed or to grow feed on-site.10 Developments in chemistry and food technology broke corn
down into its constitutive compounds (sugars, proteins, stabilizers, etc.) and then reformed them for mass production
of processed foods.11
Above, we claimed that Americans are largely corn on
legs. Is this a crazy claim? Consider that more than onequarter of the 45,000 items in a supermarket contain corn.12
As measured by a mass spectrometer, the corn-derived carbon in a McDonald’s Happy Meal comprises 100% of the
carbon in a soda, 78% of the carbon in a milk shake, 56% in
Chicken Nuggets, 52% in a cheeseburger, and 23% in
French fries, which you may have foolishly thought was all
potato and cooking oil.13 The net result of all this can be seen
as quite positive. The widespread use of cheap corn in processed foods has resulted in a huge drop in raw material
costs of major food producers.14 Consumers have been the
7. This history of corn subsidies is drawn from Michael Pollan, Is
Corn Making Us Fat?, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2003 [hereinafter
Pollan NYT].
8. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Corn Briefing Room: Policy, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/Corn/policy.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2008).
9. Powell, supra note 4.
10. Id.
11. Michael Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals 91 (2006) [hereinafter Pollan].
12. Powell, supra note 4.
13. Id.
14. Pollan, supra note 11.
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beneficiaries, enjoying much lower food prices for a dizzying range of products. Consider that in 1930, the average
American family spent almost one-quarter of its disposable
personal income on food. Today, food costs account for less
than one-tenth. This has freed up a large percentage of a
family’s earnings to spend on other needs, such as education, housing, and recreation. There is no question that increasingly low food prices have played a major role in the
story of American prosperity.15
Turning to fuel, one finds a similar story. Corn used for
ethanol has tripled since 2000 and now accounts for 95% of
U.S. ethanol production.16 At first glance, using a renewable
resource to substitute for nonrenewable oil looks quite attractive. Plants take carbon dioxide out of the air, so burning
them should result in no additional carbon emissions, creating a boon for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
The same carbon that the plant removed from the atmosphere is simply being released. Indeed, several years ago,
major environmental groups called for even greater reliance
on ethanol.17 Relying on corn grown in America to fuel
American cars should decrease our dependence on foreign
oil and its messy security entanglements. And, finally, ethanol provides an important cash crop for rural America.
The potential for ethanol in the overall energy mix looks
promising. It has already become a mainstay of Brazil’s energy mix.18
II. The Perils of Corn
For both energy and food, the rise of corn at first seems a
win-win, with a very bright upside. On closer examination,
however, each story also presents a compelling dark side.
The very cheapness of corn has made “supersizing” portions
economical. The low cost of high-fructose corn syrup explains how convenience stores can turn a profit selling onehalf gallon of soda for 69 cents and how Coke® could expand its standard soft drink bottle from the 8-ounce container of the 1970s to the 20-ounce bottle today.19 The average American consumes over 40 pounds of high-fructose
corn syrup every year; yet, this compound was not even part
of the human diet until 1975.20 The low cost of corn as cattle
15. USDA, Food Expenditures by Families and Individuals as a Share
of Disposable Personal Income, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/
CPIFoodAndExpenditures/Data/table7.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2008).
16. Frances Cerra Whittelsey, Bio-Hope, Bio-Hype, Sierra Mag.,
Sept./Oct. 2007, at 50-51.
17. See Danny Hakim, Beyond Gasoline: Filling Up With Ethanol, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 10, 2005 (“David Friedman, a senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, an environmental group, said, ‘ethanol
has great potential to help the U.S. kick our oil habit, but that’s 20 or
30 years away.’”); see National Resources Defense Council,
Growing Energy 1-10 (2004), available at http://www.nrdc.org/
air/energy/biofuels/biofuels.pdf (presenting the case for an aggressive push for biofuels); see Danielle Murray, Ethanol’s Potential: Looking Beyond Corn (Earth Policy Institute 2005),
available at http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2005/Update49.
htm (“With improved vehicle fuel economy and the use of more-efficient cellulosic feedstocks, biofuel has the potential to supply a substantial share of the world’s automotive fuel.”).
18. See, e.g., Andrew Downie, Brazil Fights Oil Prices With Alcohol,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 7, 2005.
19. NPR Interview, supra note 6.
20. Michael Pollan, Six Rules for Eating Wisely, Time, June 4, 2005,
available at http://www.michaelpollan.com/article.php?id=77 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2008).
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feed makes beef cheaper, allowing fast-food chains to
supersize burgers and still sell them for less than ever before
in inflation-adjusted terms.21 Perhaps the most serious consequences of this bounty have been the well-publicized obesity epidemic as well as problems of malnutrition and rickets among Americans otherwise found only in developing
countries.22 Reliance on corn as cattle feed also raises animal welfare concerns, both over the cramped conditions in
CAFOs and the ulcers caused by forcing a grass-feeding animal to subsist on corn.23
While transforming corn into ethanol should, all things
being equal, release fewer GHGs than conventional fossil
fuels, one is not simply burning a plant in a random field.
Corn has to be grown, and that requires high petroleumbased inputs. Every bushel of corn consumes roughly onethird to one-half gallon of gasoline.24 Moreover, ethanol has
to be synthesized. A2005 study concluded that corn requires
29% more fossil fuel than it replaces. So corn-based ethanol
seems to be a loser in terms of GHGs.25 Nor is it truly cost effective. Ethanol enjoys not only a 54 cent subsidy per gallon,
but also a tariff of 54 cents per gallon on imported ethanol.26
The result is a net cost of $120 for every barrel of oil saved
by making ethanol.27
Crazy economics? Perhaps, but not crazy political economics. When Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) ran for president
in 2000, he declared that ethanol “is a product that would not
exist if Congress didn’t create an artificial market for it. No
one would be willing to buy it . . . . Ethanol does nothing to
reduce fuel consumption, nothing to increase our energy independence, nothing to improve air quality.”28 Yet six years
later, when campaigning in Iowa, the Straight-Talk Express
featured a different message. Senator McCain stated: “I support ethanol and I think it is a vital, a vital alternative energy
source not only because of our dependency on foreign oil
but its greenhouse gas reduction effects.”29 Perhaps it
should come as no surprise that the 2007 Energy Bill mandates the use of 36 billion gallons of biofuel by 2022.30
This is a good time to be a farmer. The year 2007 recorded
the largest corn harvest in history, up 24% from 2006.31 Ethanol distilleries now consume one-fifth of the country’s corn
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.

29.

30.
31.

Pollan NYT, supra note 7.
Powell, supra note 4.
Id.
Michael Pollan, The Great Yellow Hope, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2006
[hereinafter Yellow Hope].
David Pimentel & Tad Patzek, Ethanol Production Using Corn,
Switchgrass, and Wood; Biodiesel Production Using Soybean and
Sunflower, Nat. Resources Research, Mar. 2005, at 65.
Yellow Hope, supra note 24.
Id.
Corn Ethanol: The Great Boondoggle, A De Rigueur Scam to Appease the Hippies and the Heartland, http://www.logicalscience.
com/technology/bad/Ethanol.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2008); Jon
Birger, McCain’s Farm Flip: The Senator Has Been a Critic of Ethanol. That Doesn’t Play in Iowa. So the Straight Talk Express Has
Taken a Detour, Fortune, Oct. 31, 2006.
In response, Brown University professor Darrell West quipped:
“Well, at least now we know he’s serious about running for president.” Id.
Michael Grunwald, The Clean Energy Scam, Time, Apr. 7, 2008, at
44 [hereinafter Grunwald].
USDA, 2007 Corn Crop a Record Breaker, USDA Reports, http://
www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/2008/01_11_2008.asp (last visited
Nov. 3, 2008).
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crop.32 In the past three years, there have been record crops,
but demand for foodstuffs, feed, and fuel is growing, as
well, driving up prices. Nor is this demand limited to the
United States. As populous developing countries such as
China and India get wealthier, their diets are shifting to
greater consumption of meat. Producing 100 calories of
beef, for instance, requires roughly 700 calories of grain,
so the demand for animal feed should continue to grow
well into the future.33
The perverse effects of corn’s dominance, however, have
proven more widespread than anyone anticipated, playing
out in a number of dimensions. First, as the price of corn
continues to go up, soy and wheat fields are converted to
corn production. Soy and wheat supplies go down as demand for corn stays constant or goes up, with the result of increasing costs for the foods dependent on these grains, such
as meat, milk, and eggs (sometimes called agflation). The
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to food
claimed that diverting arable land from the production of
crops to fuel is “a crime against humanity.”34
Second, as agricultural production responds to market
signals and shifts toward high-profit crops, farmers remove
land from the Conservation Reserve Program and other conservation programs.35 The government payments to retire
agricultural land for ecosystem services such as erosion
control and wildlife habitat are simply no longer high
enough to compensate for market prices.
In a final knock-on effect, as corn production increases
and the prices for soy and grain go up, international markets
respond. In particular, Brazilian cattle pastures are converted to soy production (which is now commanding record
prices), and cattlemen move into rainforest, accelerating
tropical deforestation.36 As Brazilian ecologist Sandro
Menezes has lamented: “The price of soybeans goes up and
the forest comes down.”37 Overall, the conversion of rainforests, savannahs, grasslands for corn/sugarcane (ethanol)
and palms/soybean (biodiesel) has led to a large destruction
of carbon sinks and release of carbon stored in soils. Researchers estimate that this cascade has released 17 to 420
times more carbon than the annual savings from replacing
fossil fuels.38
III. Corn and the Politics of Consumption
Corn is clearly becoming a salient political issue, but how
should we think about the politics of consumption in this
context? Can consumer decisions contribute to improving
an environmentally and socially perverse corn economy?
Thinking through this question provides not only a way of
32. Grunwald, supra note 30, at 42.
33. See Paul Roberts, The End of Food 209 (2007).
34. Julian Borger, UN Chief Calls for Review of Biofuels Policy,
Guardian, Apr. 5, 2008. Hence this analysis: “Land for soy oilseeds is increasingly being diverted to grow corn, reducing soy supply and driving up animal feed prices, according to the company.”
Marianne Stigset, Ethanol Drives Up Food Commodity Prices,
Datagro Says, Bloomberg.com, Nov. 22, 2006.
35. David Streitfeld, As Prices Rise, Farmers Spurn Conservation Program, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2008.
36. Grunwald, supra note 30, at 42.
37. Id.
38. Joseph Fargione et al., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt,
Science, Feb. 7, 2008, at 1235.
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thinking more clearly about the future of corn, it also sheds
light on the nature of consumption politics generally—its
potential and limits for the next generation of environmental challenges.
We first need to be clear on what it means to describe consumption as a political act. In broad terms, one can identify
three distinct models of “consumption as politics.” The first
two are the most straightforward and well-developed models, and are also the least likely to be effective in the context
of corn. The third is both relatively complex and relatively
nascent. Perhaps for both reasons, it has the greatest potential to affect both corn futures and other rising environmental challenges with some similar features, notably climate change.
A. Consumption-Channeling Policy
The first model treats consumption not as a source of norms
or law, but as an instrument of policy. In this top-down, centralized model, lawmaking frames individual consumption
choices in a way that directs them in a socially desirable
way. Government digs the channel through which consumption flows. Examples include “sin taxes” meant to discourage consumption of unhealthful products such as tobacco
and alcohol, labeling requirements that encourage informed
and health-conscious purchases, and default rules that take
advantage of anchoring bias by automatically enrolling
them in retirement programs unless they explicitly opt-out,
rather than require them explicitly to opt-in. As the examples suggest, these policies vary in their rationale and their
instruments. As for rationale, sin taxes are paternalistic,
raising the costs of unhealthful choices, while labeling requirements are compatible with market-libertarian principles in that they aim only at producing informed choices.
As for instruments, default rules take advantage of cognitive bias, specifically the anchoring effect of an assigned
starting point for a decision, while labeling requirements
and taxes aim to affect the decision calculus in more straightforward ways.
However such policy is constructed, it is defined by involving consumption only as an instrument of centralized
policymaking, usually formulated by a legislature or regulatory agency. The centralized authority establishes the goals
and selects the policy instruments to pursue them; it so happens that these goals are achieved through the choices of
consumers, decisions benevolently guided by government
action. Although there may be some hope that the policies
will set in motion a norm cascade or other change that is
driven by consumption choices, rather than simply utilizing
them, this is not the main intended effect of the policy.
B. Conviction-Expressing Consumption
The second model is very different. Call it conviction-expressing consumption, or just expressive consumption. The
source of its goals is in the values of individual consumers.
Consumers following this model try to make choices that
are consistent with their core convictions and moral identities. These goals do not arise from government policy, as in
the consumption-channeling model, nor are they part of a
political strategy aimed at affecting such policy. Instead,
they express the identities of the consumers. Consumers following this model may aim, for instance, to avoid purchases

12-2008

of meat raised in industrial conditions, products of exploited, e.g., sweatshop, slave, or convict, labor, or food that
is not produced locally.
Conviction-expressing consumption differs from consumption-channeling policy in both the source of its values
(centralized political decisions versus individual conscience) and the standard of success (changing consumption
patterns versus preserving the integrity of conscience). Each
model also expresses a distinct strand of American political
tradition. Consumption-channeling policy has its roots in
the Progressive era ambition for government: to manage a
complex economy in keeping with “rational” social goals.39
While this tradition has recently been updated to reflect personal liberty concerns, as in the libertarian paternalism of
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, the core ambition is that
of welfarist Progressive era regulators.40 By contrast, the
conviction-expressing model goes back to the moral perfectionism of radical abolitionists influenced by William Lloyd
Garrison, who sought to withdraw their consent and participation from a constitutional order that they saw as indelibly
tainted by slavery.41 In modern consumption politics, it
emerges from the writings of thinkers such as Wendell
Berry, who argue that individuals should consume (economically and metabolically) in a way that minimizes their
entanglement with an environmentally destructive agricultural economy.42
The line between expressive consumption and the third
category, strategic consumption, can be ambiguous, but the
core distinction lies in the standard of success. While both
abolitionists and sustainability-oriented agrarians have
hoped that their choices would influence the larger society,
they have also counted their work done if their own choices
are morally appropriate. The basic goal in this model is to
protect the integrity of one’s own conscience, though one
hopes to influence others to do the same. In strategic consumption, the individual choice is an instrument of a political and public relations campaign to change policy. Preserving one’s own conscience is nice, but neither necessary
nor sufficient for success, which comes with changing laws
and institutional practices.
C. Strategic Consumption
In strategic consumption, consumers make purchases in a
manner intended to change the structure of the economy. As
in conviction-expressing consumption, the consumer is a
source of values. Here, however, the standard of success is
not just the bar of conscience, but the bar of politics—or of
industry practice. Strategic consumption succeeds when individual choices contribute to a successful effort to change
laws or institutional behavior.
Of course, expressive consumption choices may result in
similar effect by reducing economic reward to certain indus39. See Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920
(1999); Morton Keller, Regulating a New Economy: Public
Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900-1933 (1990).
40. See Richard Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving
Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008).
41. See Henry Mayer, All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison
and the Abolition of Slavery (1998).
42. See Wendell Berry, The Art of the Common-Place: The
Agrarian Essays of Wendell Berry (Norman Wirzba ed.,
2002).
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try practices. What typically distinguishes strategic consumption is participation in some explicitly political movement or organization that links the consumption choices to a
set of programmatic demands. This was the strategy, for instance, of the Rainforest Action Network’s (RAN’s) campaign to induce Home Depot and other large home-improvement retailers to adopt sustainable sourcing policies
for forestry products.43 RAN presented itself as the representative of millions of conservation-minded consumers,
and the prospect of a boycott, rather than any actual economic damage, convinced retailers to adopt sustainablesourcing policies. Presumably a more complex economic
calculus also informed the decision: such choices always
depend on costs and benefits outside the ambit of strategic
consumption, as well as those that strategic consumption
choices can affect. Similar campaigns persuaded footwear
and clothing manufacturers to adopt anti-sweatshop policies for their contractors in the late 1990s.44
The distinct advantage of strategic consumption as politics is twofold. First, the presence of a movement makes a
consumption choice into an articulate “vote,” which the targeted industry or government can understand, rather than a
personal protest without a comprehending audience. Hence
Pollan’s claim that we have three votes a day, one at each
meal. Second, strategic consumption can leverage a relatively small change in actual consumer behavior into a perceived threat to profit or legitimacy. Thus changed consumer behavior plus demands for specific changes in practices are potentially much more potent than changed consumer behavior alone.
IV. Consumption and the Corn Economy
Consumption-channeling policy and expressive consumption both face serious limitations as approaches to the corn
economy. While there are also reasons to doubt whether
strategic consumption can be effective in this context, it has
the greatest potential of the three models.
A. Consumption-Channeling Policy and Public Choice
The problem for consumption-channeling policy lies in its
dependence on centralized political decisions as the source
of values. As we set out earlier in this Article, much of the
perverse operation of the corn economy is a result of classic public-choice dynamics: agricultural interests’ capture
of legislative subsidies for both food-corn and energy-corn. Any consumption-channeling policy that aimed
to reduce the prominence of corn in food or fuel would
have to pass through the same legislative processes that
have produced and sustained very substantial subsidies.
This seems improbable, to say the least, without a major
change in the incentives of legislators. A model of consumption politics that depends on government to generate
its orienting values cannot pull itself up by the bootstraps
to generate values opposite those the same government is
presently pursuing. That sort of change depends on exogenous political activity.

43. See Jedediah Purdy, Being America: Liberty, Commerce, and
Violence in an American World 251-67 (2003).
44. See id. at 149-66.
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B. Expressive Consumption: Salience and Relevance
As noted earlier, while expressive consumption aims
mainly at preserving the individual conscience, its marketplace impacts can affect law or industry structure. Because
we are concerned with policy, that is the possibility that interests us here. It is highly unlikely, however, that conscience-driven choices could be either widespread or effective enough for policy relevance unless they were linked to a
campaign of strategic consumption.
The first reason this is true is the relevance of private
choices. Most of the consumption decisions that drive the
corn economy are not individual choices, but those of industrial actors in food and fuel production. This means that unlike with a consumer-oriented product such as tobacco, consumer decisions cannot simply “add up” to reducing or
eliminating consumption of corn. To be effective, consumer
decisions will have to feed back into corporate choices and,
in all likelihood, the political decisions that set the context
of corporate choice.
Pollan’s image of consumption as voting ironically highlights the limits of expressive consumption as a source of
change in the corn economy. The worth of a vote depends on
the set of alternatives that the ballot offers and their relevance to the issues the consumer-voter might hope to affect.
To envision the alternatives-deprived end of the spectrum,
imagine a news report describing the re-election of an authoritarian dictator by 99.6% of the vote, on a ballot featuring him as the only candidate. That is not, to put it mildly, a
potent vote. Some consumer choices relevant to the corn
economy are of this character. In buying gasoline, for instance, one does not choose whether to include the ethanol
additive in the purchase: that aspect of the ballot has been
set by a prior political decision. In other cases, the consumer’s ballot is skewed, as in a gerrymandered electoral
system that favors an established party even when it receives less popular support than an insurgent alternative.
Even if some consumers eschewed products containing
corn, the economic effect of their choices would be substantially diluted by the legislative subsidies that structure industries’ sourcing decisions.
The second problem with expressive consumption is the
likely salience of corn—its prominence among the concerns
of conscience that might inspire consumers to avoid it. Continuing with Pollan’s electoral analogy, the efficacy of voting depends on voters taking the trouble to be well informed
about the choices presented on the ballot. Anyone but the
most civic-minded knows the experience of marking the top
of the ticket with great confidence, then descending into
guesswork as the candidates for the school board come into
view. With limited time and mental space, consumer choice
tends to focus on a relatively small number of choices that
make up, as it were, the cognitive top of the ticket. The issues most likely to acquire this salience are those to which
some simple and vivid mental image attaches, such as children working in a workshop or a rainforest slashed and
burnt; or those that come to embody a sharply perceived
threat, such as alar, dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
(DDT), or asbestos. The need for salience does not favor an
issue such as corn production, a highly complex system
shaped by agricultural, economic, and political factors,
which does not lend itself to a simple, morally charged mental image.
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Also disadvantageous is that corn lacks the poisonous associations of a fearsome shibboleth such as DDT: at worst, it
is unhealthful, not toxic.45 Corn is, in short, a bad candidate
for the top of the expressive consumer’s cognitive ticket.
C. Strategic Consumption and the Corn Economy
Strategic consumption is the most promising model for affecting the corn economy because it aims at either amplifying dissenting “votes,” as with RAN campaigns, or changing the ballot by putting new political questions on the table.
A strategic-consumption campaign, for instance, might announce a product boycott as expressing a demand to eliminate corn subsidies for food or fuel production, or both.
Such a boycott might target, for instance, a restaurant chain
using a large share of corn-fed meat, or an oil company
heavily engaged in the corn-ethanol industry; but the ultimate aim would be to create both the perception and the reality of widespread support for restructuring the corn economy, reaching all the way back to subsidies. Such a campaign would also be an appeal to consumers to treat the corn
economy as an icon of environmental destruction, as rainforest clearing came to be in the 1980s and 1990s. In other
words, it would be a dynamic engagement with the values of
citizens and the interests of industries, as well as the government decisions that express and shape both of these.
A campaign of this sort might benefit from exogenous
changes in the interests affecting political decisions. For instance, a growing clean-energy industry might demand that
ethanol be stripped of its subsidies, and link its interestbased influence to the program of a strategic-consumption campaign.
The success of any strategic-consumption campaign would
depend on unknowable factors: whether the campaign developed political salience in public minds, whether it identified visible and vulnerable boycott targets (or beneficiaries
of supportive purchases), and whether it achieved alliances
with interest groups. Nonetheless, because it aims to affect
not just individual choice, but the context of both individual
and political choice, it is the alternative with the most potential to affect an issue with the characteristics of the corn
economy: a complex system, without an obvious shibboleth,
shaped by political decisions and industrial consumption, in
which the existing ballot of consumer alternatives is less expansive than the chances that environmentally oriented consumers would wish to bring about. It is impossible to forecast success for a multifarious and dynamic strategy; but it is
equally impossible confidently to predict failure. The potential of the strategy is at least up to the nature of the problem.
V. A Comparison: Corn and Carbon
Although space does not permit us to elaborate on the idea
here, it is worth noting that corn shares many relevant features with that most urgent and au courant commodity, carbon. The foremost GHG contributing to climate change and
the touchstone for proposed climate policies, carbon is a
45. For a thoughtful exploration of the different aspects of the corn economy and the difficulty in labeling it simply good or bad, see the 2007
documentary, “King Corn,” following the journey of two recent college graduates as they trace the paths of corn from a single acre they
have planted in Iowa to its food and fuel markets. The film’s website
is at http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/kingcorn/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2008).
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pervasive and frequently invisible part of nearly every sector of the economy—prominently including energy and agriculture. Invisibility, pervasiveness, and non-toxicity are
all reasons to expect that it will be difficult for carbon to become a shibboleth of expressive consumption, just as it will
likely be difficult for corn. Moreover, as with corn, many
relevant carbon-consumption decisions are taken at the industrial level, by energy companies or manufacturers, rather
than individuals, restricting the relevance of any expressive
consumer agenda that did emerge. Finally, the carbon economy reflects political decisions to leave the harms of carbon
emissions unpriced, that is, as externalities. Although this is
technically different from the subsidies that structure the
corn economy, it amounts to a subsidy relative to lower carbon alternatives. This means that consumer choices will be
pushing uphill unless attached to an explicit and politically
effective agenda for structural reform of the price incentives
surrounding carbon-consumption choices.
Carbon may be different from corn in one critical respect:
the fact that Congress has embraced pro-carbon subsidies in
the past might not be strong evidence that it will resist future
steps to discourage carbon-emitting consumption. Climate
change is an issue of sufficient perceived urgency that the
political climate of tomorrow’s debate may be relevantly
different from that of the past. In other respect, however,
corn and carbon are similar enough to yield a few parallel
conclusions about the prospects of consumer politics to affect either issue. First, expect little systemic result from expressive choices, because the nature of the commodity (pervasive, often invisible, nontoxic) makes it unlikely to become highly salient and the pattern of consumption (institutional rather than individual, and with subsidies tilting the
price structure) limits the possible relevance of consumer
choices. Second, be skeptical of the prospects of centralized, top-down reforms to discourage harmful consumption—although changing political times may shift the
ground enough to make such reform possible. Third, if results come from any quarter, it will likely be strategic consumption, which aims expressly to shift that political
ground, and relies on consumer choices as instruments in a
broader campaign.
VI. Conclusion
The ideal of consumption-channeling policy is that a benign
and rational government can shape the context of individual
choice to benefit social welfare. The ideal of expressive consumption is that responsible individual choices can honor
the demands of conscience and perhaps in the process contribute to a responsible economy. In the question of corn,
consumption channeling is likely to fail because government decisions are neither rational nor benign, but the
source of the corn economy’s perverse features. Expressive
consumption is also likely to fail, partly for reasons of salience, partly because those same government decisions
limit the scope and possible efficacy of individual choice.
Sometimes, to be able to choose responsibly, we must
first change the context of our choices. To do so, in turn, we
sometimes have to change the politics that shape that context. The corn economy presents would-be reformers with
just this kind of challenge. Although there is no guarantee of
success, only the political mobilization of strategic consumption has much chance of finishing the job.

